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Abstract This paper introduces and analyzes a new kind of non-acceptance, non-
disagreeing move: resistance. We focus in particular on attention-targeted resistance
facilitated by epistemic possibility claims. In this response type, we suggest, an agent
draws attention to some subsidiary issue that they think might cause an interlocutor
to withdraw a previous commitment. We develop a granularity model of attention
where drawing attention in discourse can refine the space of possibilities under
consideration and consequently lead to changes in view.
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1 Resistance moves
The two most obvious ways that an agent can respond to an assertion are to agree or
to disagree with it. This paper explores a response type that does not slot neatly into
either of these categories: resistance moves, witnessed below.
(1) Party. Alice and Bob are on their way to an opening party at the Whitney
Museum. They hope to see their friend Charlie there who has recently broken
up with his girlfriend Diana.
A: Charlie is coming to the party.
B: Okay. / That’s not true! (agreement / disagreement)
B′: Diana might be there. (epistemic resistance move)
In simple disagreement, a speaker directly indicates that they are unwilling for the
proposed claim to be incorporated into the common ground—the claim is rejected
outright. That is not what happens with resistance. Resistance moves instead
indicate unwillingness to incorporate a proposal before some subsidiary issue has
been explored. In (1), B wants to ensure that A is aware of some facts about Diana
that (in this context) might bear on the truth of A’s claim.
* For discussion of this topic we are grateful to audiences at JHU, ILLC, the New York Philosophy of
Language Workshop, the Unstructured Conference at Rutgers in April 2016, SALT 26 at UT Austin,
as well as María Biezma, Fabrizio Cariani, Lucas Champollion, Ivano Ciardelli, Jeroen Groenendijk,
Daniel Hoek, Harvey Lederman, and Floris Roelofsen.
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Epistemic resistance moves
In this paper we focus on epistemic resistance moves where the resistance is
mainly signaled with an epistemic possibility modal. The category of resistance,
once defined, turns out to be much larger than this, as illustrated by a sampling of
responses in this Bridges scenario.
(2) Bridges. Charlie is supposed to meet Alice and Bob for dinner in Manhattan
and he calls to tell them that he is just leaving his place in Brooklyn. A little
later, Alice and Bob hear on the radio that westbound trains are delayed and
there is heavy traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge.
A: Charlie is going to be late for dinner.
B: He might take the Manhattan Bridge. (epistemic resistance move)
B′: What if he takes the Manhattan Bridge?
B′′: Is there traffic on the Manhattan Bridge as well?
B′′′: The Manhattan Bridge isn’t too far from his home.
Resistance moves are in no way incompatible with the resisted claim. Unlike
corrections and other rejection moves, they do not put a conversation in a crisis state
(cf. Farkas & Bruce 2010) where any issues under discussion can be settled only
after the original speaker or rejector retracts one of their commitments, or they agree
to disagree.1 This is evident from follow-ups in a resistance discourse:
(3) (Bridges continuations)
B: He might take the Manhattan Bridge.
A: Good point. If he takes the Manhattan Bridge, he might not be late.
A′: I was overlooking that option. However, if Charlie takes the Manhattan
Bridge, he’s still going to be late.
A′′: I already considered that option.
Our proposal about epistemic resistance moves is that they work by targeting
speakers’ attention (Ciardelli, Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2011; de Jager 2009; Franke
& de Jager 2010). In particular, they draw attention to some issue that the resister
thinks the resistee might have overlooked. We model attention using a Yalcin (2011)-
style granularity model in which overlooking an issue makes an agent unable to ‘see’
propositions relevant to that issue; shifting attention onto that issue can therefore
cause certain latent premises to become visible, leading (potentially) to a change in
what the resistee is willing to publicly commit to. At the level of discourse dynamics,
1 Compatibility differentiates them from Khoo 2015 on modal disagreement, as well as similar
disagreement data in Klecha 2014. Also, while resistance moves may overlap with clarification
requests (Ginzburg 1998, 2012), many resistance moves are not requests at all.
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we suggest that (to borrow a term from Roberts 1996) resistance moves indicate a
strategy for coordinating on whether to incorporate the content of some assertion
into the common ground. We provide an implementation of this using a version of
Farkas & Bruce’s 2010 notion of the Table. In what follows, we first develop the
proposal about attention in §2, then incorporate this into a dynamics for resistance
in §3, and conclude in §4.
2 Resistance and attention
In this section we develop a granularity model of attention based on ideas in Hulstijn
2000, Yalcin 2008, 2011, de Jager 2009, Franke & de Jager 2010, and Fritz &
Lederman 2015. But first, let us briefly mention a potentially simpler alternative.
In line with Lewis 1979 and Stalnaker 1984 (and more recently, Rawlins 2010
and Klecha 2014), it is tempting to say that after Bob resists Party (1), Alice’s sphere
of relevant alternatives expands outward to include previously ignored possibilities
in which Diana comes to the party. Inattention, on this view, amounts to tacitly
assuming that certain maximal possibilities are out of the running: certain possible
worlds are simply ignored (or circumscribed; McCarthy 1980) by the agent.
But this idea, while plausible in some cases, is not generally adequate. In Party
(and other resistance examples), Alice needn’t be making any tacit assumptions one
way or the other about whether Diana is coming to the party.2 Rather, Alice might
simply not have factored the impact of this issue into her reasoning. This leads to a
central question: how can someone fail to attend to an issue and at the same time
still be willing in principle to accept any resolution of this issue?
2.1 Modeling attention
Our proposal here is that attention states for purposes of understanding resistance
should be thought of in terms of granularity. The starting point is Lewis’s (1988)
theory of subject matters. Let W be a nonempty set of possible worlds.
(4) Subject matters. A subject matter M ( W ×W is a total equivalence
relation over W .3 (Let M∗ be the set of subject matters.)
Every subject matter M ∈ M∗ partitions W into mutually exclusive equivalence
2 It might be strictly compatible with Alice’s initial view of the world that both Charlie and Diana are
coming since her knowledge about their breakup is inactive, and, in any case, this knowledge might
make only possibilities in which both come less plausible without ruling them out completely.
3 I.e. M is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Like Lewis, we do not count W ×W as a genuine
subject matter. See Yablo 2014 for a more general account where these needn’t be total or transitive.
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W /Π
W /M
Figure 1 From left to right: inclusion, disjointness, and non-inclusive overlap.
classes of worlds that jointly exhaust this space.4 A cell [w]M = {v : Mwv} of the
partition W /M determined by this subject matter groups together maximally specific
possible states of reality that are exactly alike with respect to it. For example, we
can model the subject of whether Diana is coming to the party with the relation MD
where MDwv just in case either w and v are both D-worlds in which Diana comes to
the party or neither w nor v is a D-world. Someone attending to MD distinguishes
between worlds in different cells of the bipartition W /MD. In (5), we provide some
helpful mereological notions for subject matters. This are illustrated visually in
Figure 1.
(5) a. Inclusion. M1 (mereologically) includes M2 just in case: M1wv only if
M2wv. We will also say this: M1 refines M2 and M2 is a coarsening of M1.
b. Overlap. M1 and M2 overlap just in case both of these subject matters
(mereologically) include a common subject matter M3. If M1 and M2 do
not overlap, they are disjoint.
c. Summation. The sum M1 +M2 + ... is the least subject matter, should
this exist, which includes each of M1,M2, ... and is included in any other
subject matter that includes these matters.
Like Fritz & Lederman 2015, we assume that: (i) anybody attending to a subject
matter M is also attending to every coarsening of M; (ii) anybody attending to
subject matters M1, M2, ... is also attending to the least subject matter M1+M2+ ...
(which exists); (iii) anybody engaged in conversation is attending to at least one
subject matter. An agent’s attention to subject matters can therefore be uniquely
characterized by the sum Π of each of the subject matters that she is attending to.
Whether this agent is attending to a subject matter M depends on whether a certain
mereological relation holds between Π and M:
(6) Attention to subject matters. An agent in attention stateΠ is fully attending
to M if Π includes M, fully overlooking M if Π and M are disjoint, and
partially attending to M otherwise.
4 This is the same kind of representation often used in the semantics literature for question denotations
(Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984; Groenendijk 1999). We return to this comparison in §2.2.
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W /Π
P1
P2
(a) P1 is visible at Π; P2 is not
W /Π
∆
(b) An agent’s view ∆ w.r.t. Π
Figure 2 Visibility and views.
To elaborate, note that some propositions will carve up W in a way that respects the
granularity of W /Π while others will cut across cells in this partition. Visibility is
illustrated graphically in Figure 2-a.
(7) Proposition P⊆W is visible at M just in case: Mwv only if (w ∈ P iff v ∈ P).
The definition of attention can now be restated in terms of visibility:
(8) An agent in attention state Π is fully attending to M if every contingent
proposition visible at M is also visible at Π, fully overlooking M if no such
proposition is visible at Π, and partially attending to M otherwise.
Since each proposition P visible at M corresponds to a way that things might be like
with respect to this subject matter, this is just to say that an agent is (fully) attending
to M if for (every) some way in which the worlds in W can differ with respect to M,
this agent distinguishes between any worlds in W that differ in this way.
To adapt some terminology from Yalcin 2011, an agent whose attention to
subject matters is representable by Π will view reality at the “modal resolution”
W /Π. From this agent’s perspective, each cell [w]Π in W /Π is a kind of “pixelated”
world, a distinct candidate for the way things are. Following the common practice of
representing an agent’s knowledge and belief states by the set of open possibilities
that are compatible with what she knows and believes, we define “views” as follows:
(9) Views. The view of an agent in attention state Π is a set of possible worlds
∆⊆W that is visible at Π. The cells in ∆/Π explicate the possibilities that
are compatible with what this participant accepts modulo Π.
An example view, relative to some space of visible propositions, is illustrated in
Figure 2-b. Applying this model to our Party case, Alice’s discourse-initial attention
state and view can be explicated using a relation Π disjoint with MD and a set ∆
of C-worlds in which Charlie is coming that is visible at Π. After Bob resists,
her attention state shifts to Π+MD and worlds in which Diana comes to the party
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and worlds in which she does not come are differentiated in Alice’s thought (more
realistically, Alice’s updated attention state will strictly include Π+MD since she
will also become sensitive to a cluster of topics that she cognitively associates with
MD). Against the more fine-grained resolution W /Π+MD, Alice’s updated view
now leaves open the chunked possibility that Charlie does not come to the party.
How can we systematically derive this attention-induced change in her view?
This is where things get tricky. In related work in progress, we argue that the
granularity model of attention is especially well-suited for handling the kind of
memory retrieval exhibited in cases like Party. The strategy pursued there is to
assign agents caches of stored background information that are “filtered” through
their awareness states to obtain their current views of reality (cf. Franke & de Jager
2010). In Party, for example, Alice’s stored information might incorporate that
Charlie is not one to miss a good party, that Charlie said he was coming to the party
a few weeks ago, that Charlie and Diana subsequently had a messy breakup, that
Charlie now wants nothing to do with Diana, etc. While the former information
supporting Charlie’s attendance is initially visible and informs Alice’s view, the latter
information about Diana is not. After Alice attends to whether Diana is coming,
however, these additional ‘latent’ premises become accessible and percolate up to
Alice’s awareness. She changes her mind on their basis.
Fortunately, we can make substantial headway on our current project without
getting into more details. As a placeholder for a fuller dynamic account of attention-
induced change in view, we will here simply hardwire this into our model by working
with a richer representation of an agent’s cognitive state consisting both of a subject
matterΠ explicating her current attention to subject matters and of a change function
δ mapping each subject matter M ∈M∗ to a set of worlds visible with respect to it.
This δ -function determines the agent’s current view ∆ at Π and also encodes how
her view can potentially vary along with her attention:
(10) Acceptance states
An agent’s acceptance state 〈δ ,Π〉 consists of a function δ : M∗→ 2W where
δ (M)⊆W is visible at M, and a subject matter Π ∈M∗. The agent’s current
view is δ (Π).
We can now say this: if Alice is initially in the acceptance state 〈δ ,Π〉 and she
comes to attend to MD, then her updated state is 〈δ ,Π+MD〉. Bracketing off any
information that Alice acquires as a result of Bob’s resistance move—about his
own state of mind or anything else for that matter—her response to this challenge
will depend on δ (Π+MD). If δ (Π+MD) includes only C-worlds in which Charlie
comes, then Alice will stand by her original assertion. But if δ (Π+MD) includes a
world in which Charlie does not come, then Alice will conditionalize or retract.
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2.2 Attention in discourse
Moving along, it is time to get our resolution-sensitive agents talking to one another.
Our starting point for incorporating attention into context will be Stalnaker’s (1978,
2002, 2014) classic theory on which a discourse unfolds against a background of
publicly available information: the common ground. In its most recent incarnation
(Stalnaker 2014), the common ground consists of propositions that are commonly
accepted by the members of a conversation: P is common ground just in case
everyone accepts P for the purposes of the conversation, everyone accepts that
everyone accepts P, everyone accepts that everyone accepts that everyone accepts P,
and so on ad infinitum.
(11) Frames v. 1. A frame F = 〈W ,{∆a : a ∈ Agt}〉 consists of a nonempty set
of worlds W and a function ∆a : W → 2W for each agent a ∈ Agt where
∆a(w) ⊆ W explicates the possibilities that are compatible with what a
accepts in w.
∆a must satisfy introspection:
For all w,v ∈W , if v ∈ ∆a(w), then ∆a(v) = ∆a(w).
(12) Acceptance. Agent a accepts P ∈ 2W in w just in case ∆a(w)⊆ P.
Introspection ensures both that if one accepts P then one accepts that one accepts P,
and that if one does not accept P then one accepts that one does not accept P. The
Stalnakerian notion of common ground can now be defined as follows:
(13) Accessibility. A sequence of worlds z1, ...,zn in W is an accessibility path
iff for each adjacent pair 〈zi,zi+1〉 in this sequence, zi+1 ∈ ∆a(zi) for some
a ∈ Agt.
R ∗wv iff there is an accessibility path z1, ...,zn with starting point z1 = w and
endpoint zn = v.
(14) Context sets v. 1. The context set in w is CS(w) = {v : R ∗wv}.
(15) Common ground v. 1. Proposition P ∈ 2W is common ground among Agt
in w just in case CS(w)⊆ P.
It is easy to verify that these definitions formalize the above acceptance hierarchy.
As for dynamics, Stalnaker 1978 famously proposes that the characteristic effect of
a successful assertion is to add the proposition P communicated with this speech
act to the common ground. The resulting frame is 〈W ,{∆a+P : a ∈ Agt}〉 where
[∆a+P](w) = ∆a(w)∩P. The updated context set at each w ∈W is CS(w)∩P.5
5 A more common tack is to remove non-P worlds from W (cf. Plaza’s (1989) Public Announcement
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In the rest of this section, we introduce attention into this Stalnakerian framework,
culminating with notions of mutual, distributed, and public attention. Running with
our resolution-sensitive model of acceptance states, a natural move is to replace the
frames in (11) with the following structures:
(16) Frames v. 2. A frame F = 〈W ,{δa,Πa : a∈Agt}〉 consists of a nonempty set
of worlds W , a function δa : W → (2W )M∗ for each agent a ∈ Agt mapping
each world w ∈W to a function δa(w) from subject matters to visible sets of
worlds, and another function Πa : W →M∗ for each agent a ∈ Agt mapping
each world w ∈W to a subject matter Πa(w).
Letting ∆a(w) = δa(w)(Πa(w)), δa and Πa must satisfy introspection:
For all w,v ∈W , if v ∈ ∆a(w), then ∆a(v) = ∆a(w) and Πa(v) =Πa(w).
Agents must now be introspective regarding both information and attention.
We also want to generalize the Stalnakerian statics in another respect. On the
original picture, whether a discourse participant accepts that something is the case
can always be understood along the lines of (12) in terms of whether she accepts a
proposition. However, as we will discuss in §3 when we turn to epistemic modality
in more detail, acceptance might not always be understandable in this way. Roughly,
what we need to say instead is something more general: agent a accepts in w that
such and such is the case if and only if her view ∆a(w) in w instantiates a certain
property p⊆ 2W which needn’t be the property of set inclusion in some proposition
(i.e., there needn’t be a P⊆W such that ∆a(w) ∈ p iff ∆a(w)⊆ P). We can still stick
with Stalnaker’s latest characterization of common ground as common acceptance,
but we must now say this: a property p of views (such as including a D-world) is
common ground just in case everyone’s view of the world instantiates p, everyone
accepts that everyone has a view that instantiates p, and so on. Of course, much of
the higher-level acceptance required for common ground status can and often will
be tacit.
To accommodate this kind of account, we will need to revise the notions of
common ground and context sets. The context set CS(w) in w will now collect the
view and attention state of each member of Agt in w, the view and attention state of
each member of Agt at each world compatible with someone’s view in w, and so on:
(17) Context sets v. 2. Let Ww = {w}∪{v : R ∗wv} designate the set containing
w and any world reachable from w along R ∗. The context set in w is
CS(w) = {〈∆a(v),Πa(v)〉 : a ∈ Agt,v ∈Ww}.
Logic). The discourse updates in this paper will all leave W intact and alter only structures defined
over this space (more closely resembling the dynamic systems in Gerbrandy & Groeneveld 1997; van
Benthem & Liu 2007; Kooi & Renne 2011; van Benthem & Minica˘ 2012; etc.).
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A property p of views is common ground in w among the participants in Agt just
in case their views all instantiate p, their views at worlds compatible with anyone’s
first-order view all instantiate p, and so forth. Equivalently, p is common ground
just in case all of the views in CS(w) instantiate it:
(18) Common ground v. 2. Property p⊆ 2W is common ground among Agt in w
just in case for all 〈∆a(v),Πa(v)〉 ∈CS(w), p(∆a(v)).6
But why stop at common ground for information? Now that we are focusing on
attention and have resolutions in the mix, we can also extend a kind of common
ground status to subject matters. In fact, we can define a variety of collective (full)
attention concepts by analogy with some standard kinds of group knowledge:7
(19) Mutual attention. The members of Agt are mutually attending to M in w
just in case for all a ∈ Agt, Πa(w) includes M.
(20) Distributed attention. The members of Agt are distributively attending to
M in w just in case Πa(w)+Πb(w)+ ... includes M.
(21) Public attention. The members of Agt are publicly attending to M in w just
in case for each 〈∆a(v),Πa(v)〉 ∈CS(w), Πa(v) includes M.8
That is, the participants in Agt are mutually attending to M iff everyone is sensitive to
this issue, distributively attending to M iff their combined attention state is sensitive
to this issue, and commonly attending to M iff they are mutually attending to M and
this is commonly accepted.
These collective attention concepts might bring to mind the concept of a Question
Under Discussion (QUD; Roberts 1996, 2012; Ginzburg 1996, 2012), a contextually
salient discourse topic that interlocutors are collaboratively answering.9 But while
we think that QUDs are intimately related to our group attention concepts, especially
to public attention, there are good theoretical reasons to distinguish these concepts
from one another. Subjects under public attention—let us call these ‘SUPs’ for
6 It is worth stressing that if every property expressible via assertion amounted to set inclusion in some
proposition, then there would be little point in revising the original definitions: CSv.1(w) =
⋃
CSv.2(w)
so CSv.1(w) ⊆ P just in case ∆a(v) ⊆ P for each ∆a(v) ∈ CSv.2(w). However, ‘unpacking’ the
Stalnakerian model along the lines of (17) and (18) allows us to handle other kinds of properties.
7 See Fagin, Halpern, Moses & Vardi 1995 for a good survey of knowledge in multi-agent settings.
8 Ciardelli & Roelofson 2015 defines related notions of public entertainment and wonderment. Won-
dering about an issue (in this sense) involves having a preference to reach a state in which this issue
is resolved, and entertaining is a technical notion that amounts to wondering or knowing. We think
that attending to an issue is more basic; it needn’t involve having a preference to resolve the issue but
is rather a precondition for having such a preference. One must distinguish between the distinctions
between worlds that an agent is sensitive to from those distinctions that she cares about.
9 For instance, Fritz & Lederman (2015) suggest that a QUD might be the join of the individual
resolutions of the discourse participants.
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short—might be regarded as the questions that could be asked given the distinctions
that the interlocutors are aware of (in a strong iterated sense). But unlike mere
SUPs (i.e., SUPs not under discussion), QUDs are typically taken to carry a public
discourse goal of resolving or answering them (or otherwise dispelling them (Isaacs
& Rawlins 2008); for e.g., by denying a presupposition or determining that they are
practically unanswerable). Given their attendant commitments, QUDs constrain the
flow of future discourse in a way that mere SUPs do not.
3 The dynamics of resistance
With the machinery for attention developed in previous sections, we are now in a
position to turn to the account of resistance. The key idea is that epistemic resistance
moves signal an unwillingness to immediately accept by drawing attention to some
relevant issue. We formalize this using the notion of a Table from Farkas & Bruce
2010. The table is a holding-slot in context where assertions (and other moves) that
are candidates for being accepted into the common ground (‘proposals’) are kept
before they are accepted (or retracted). Resistance, on our proposal, amounts to a
strategy for coordinating on whether a proposal should be accepted. The sketch is that
the resisted move stays on the table while a related issue is discussed, and the agent
who originally made the proposal has a chance to reaffirm or retract their proposal
in light of new information. Relative to the present paper, the new information is
always revealed by a shift in attention, though there may be other mechanisms for
resistance. (This proposal for the dynamics of resistance, a generalization of Rawlins
2010, is independent of the attention mechanisms we have developed here, though
for epistemic resistance moves we suggest that both pieces are necessary.)
To keep things focused, let us now narrow in on the following variant of Party:
(22) A: Charlie is coming to the party.
B: Diana might be coming.
A: Good point. Then Charlie might not come.
Before formalizing the dynamics of resistance, we first informally walk through how
we take this discourse to proceed. Suppose that (22) takes place in a background
context where the following facts obtains: (i) Alice and Bob are inquiring into
whether Charlie is coming; (ii) Alice accepts that Charlie is coming; (iii) Alice is not
attending to whether Diana is coming; (iv) Alice knows that Charlie and Diana just
had a messy breakup, but this is initially off her radar. If Alice weren’t overlooking
Diana, then Alice would accept that Charlie might not come; (v) Bob is not sure
whether or not Charlie is coming; according to what Bob accepts, Charlie might
come but he might not. Bob is also not sure if Diana is coming (unlike Alice, he is
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considering this issue); (vi) Bob is not sure whether or not (ii) holds; (vii) Bob is not
sure whether or not (iii) holds.
First phase. Alice asserts that Charlie is coming. As a result, ‘Charlie is coming to
the party’ is added to the assertion stack of the table. In making her assertion, Alice
intends for Bob’s acceptance state to come to share the property, instantiated by her
own acceptance state, of excluding the possibility that Charlie is not coming. The
sentence on the stack encodes this coordination effort. After her assertion, Alice is
publicly committed to Charlie coming; Bob accepts that Alice accepts this.
Second phase. Bob resists Alice’s claim by asserting that Diana might be coming,
temporarily deferring acceptance or rejection of her claim while the context reaches
an equilibrium with respect to attention states. This resistance move adds ‘Diana
might be coming [to the party]’ to the assertion stack above Alice’s earlier utterance.
Note that ‘Charlie is coming to the party’ must remain on the stack in order to make
sense of alternative Party continuations like this:
(23) A: Charlie is coming to the party.
B: Diana might be coming.
A: No, she isn’t.
B: I see. Do you know what time he’ll show up?
In this exchange, Alice does not reassert that Charlie is coming after Bob’s resistance
move. However, Bob’s final question presupposes that Charlie is coming, so Bob
must accept that he is coming after Alice responds to the resistance.
How exactly should we understand Bob’s epistemic modal claim? We want
to remain fairly noncommittal in this paper about how modal speech works. As a
baseline account of epistemic might, though, we will tentatively adopt some ideas
from Veltman 1996 and Yalcin 2008, 2011. Yalcin argues that for Bob to accept
that Diana might be coming is not for him to be in a “second-order” state of mind
where he accepts that it is compatible with some contextually salient information
(his evidence, some group’s evidence, etc.) that Diana is coming. On Yalcin’s “first-
order” model, Bob is rather in an acceptance state that leaves open the possibility
that Diana will attend. Accepting that Diana might be coming is not a matter of
accepting this or that proposition; it is rather a matter of being in a state of mind
compatible with the “prejacent” proposition that Diana is coming.10 As Veltman
10 As Yalcin himself recognizes, compatibility with the proposition that Diana is coming is intuitively
not enough to accept that Diana might be coming. More is needed. But what? According to Yalcin,
Bob must also be sensitive to the question of whether Diana is coming (this amounts to being
“appropriately receptive”, in some sense, to information which speaks to the question of whether
Diana will come; it has nothing to do with attention) and Bob’s state of mind with respect to this
question must leave open the possibility that Diana is coming. We are not sure that this is the right
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would then put it, in asserting that Diana might be coming, Bob is inviting Alice to
perform a “test” on her acceptance state to check whether it shares this property.
This proposal is encoded by the sentence now lying at the top of the assertion stack.
In any case, for present purposes what are most interesting are the attentional
effects of Bob’s modal claim. Before the resistance, Bob was neutral (given the
scenario) as to whether Alice was attending to whether Diana is coming; even if
Alice was attending to this issue, she and Bob were still not publicly attending to it.
But after Bob resists, he accepts that Alice is attending to whether Diana is coming
(and Alice accepts that Bob accepts that Alice is attending to this issue, and so forth).
Furthermore, as a result of becoming aware of Diana, Alice changes her mind about
Charlie. She now accepts that Diana might come and keep Charlie away.11
Third phase. Rather than rejecting or counter-resisting Bob’s assertion, Alice agrees
that Diana might come (this is signaled with the verbal marker ‘Good point’; in fact,
this expression further signals that Alice thinks Bob’s modal assertion is relevant
to the goals of their exchange). After this confirmation, ‘Diana might be coming’
is removed from the stack and the corresponding property of leaving open the
possibility that Diana is coming becomes common ground.
Fourth phase. Alice now retracts her initial assertion and concedes that Charlie
might not be coming to the party (there is no explicit retraction marker like ‘I take that
back’; the retraction is rather signaled by the continuation that is incompatible with
Alice’s earlier assertion). This retraction+concession sequence removes ‘Charlie is
coming to the party’ from the assertion stack and replaces it with ‘Charlie might not
come [to the party]’. At this point, Bob realizes that Alice has changed her mind
about Charlie. Bob now accepts that Alice accepts that Charlie might not come.
Fifth phase. Bob silently accepts Alice’s claim. As a result, ‘Charlie might not
come’ is removed from the stack and the property of leaving open the possibility
that Charlie is not coming becomes common ground.
Things have gotten complex: unpacking our superficially straightforward Party
thing to say but we will bracket off this issue. Since we are concerned primarily with the attentional
effects of epistemic possibility claims, we will just work with the simple compatibility account in the
main text in place of a richer account.
11 Though we will not explicitly model this, it is worth noting that Bob’s resistance move has the further
attentional effect that Alice comes to focus on the proposition that Diana is coming which is “visible”
to Alice only after Bob’s modal claim. Alice takes Bob to be challenging her assertion only over
the D-worlds where Diana attends the party. Pace Ciardelli et al. 2011; Ciardelli, Groenendijk &
Roelofsen 2014; Roelofsen 2013 who present an attentive semantics for ‘might’ where the potential
for an epistemic possibility claim to draw attention to the possibilities for its prejacent is hardwired
into the semantics, we think that ‘might’ sentences can bring about attention to propositions through
a pragmatic mechanism; the attention change potential for ‘might’ needn’t be built into its semantic
entry. Unfortunately, we do not have space to go into details here.
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example has revealed an amalgam of informative and attentive updates, discourse
structuring mechanisms, and evolving higher-order attitudes. In the rest of this
section, we develop the formal machinery underpinning this complexity.
3.1 Discourse models
To begin, consider a formal language L with a countable set AtL of sentence letters
‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ..., negation ‘¬’ and conjunction ‘∧’, and epistemic possibility ‘♦’.
Assume that L has the usual grammar and let SL designate the set of all well-formed
sentences of L . To interpret L , we use a ‘textbook’ dynamic semantics.
(24) Discourse models. A model M = 〈W ,{δa,Πa : a ∈ Agt},V 〉 consists of a
frame F and an interpretation function V : AtL → 2W mapping each atom
ϕAt ∈ AtL to the set V (ϕAt) of ϕAt-worlds in W .
(25) Updates on information states. The following recursive clauses extend V
to the update function + : SL → (2W )2W (implicitly relativized to M ):
i+ϕAt = i∩V (ϕAt)
i+¬ϕ = i\ i+ϕ Heim 1983
i+ϕ ∧ψ = (i+ϕ)+ψ Heim 1982
i+♦ϕ = {w ∈ i : i+ϕ 6= /0} Veltman 1996
We also define updates over subject matters. These updates are quite simple and
could in fact be stated in a more general way: each sentence letter ϕAt appearing in
the update rule +ϕ introduces the polar issue of whether ϕAt .
(26) Updates on subjects. Letting MϕAt = {〈w,v〉 : w ∈ V (ϕAt) iff v ∈ V (ϕAt)},
the update function + : SL → (M∗)M∗ is defined as follows (for a cleaner
presentation, we use the same notation for both of our update functions):
M+ϕAt = M∩MϕAt M+ϕ ∧ψ = (M+ϕ)+ψ
M+¬ϕ = M+ϕ M+♦ϕ = M+ϕ (cf. Yalcin 2011)
We can now define incorporation for both information states and subject matters.
The idea is the same in both cases: an information state or subject matter incorporates
ϕ (notation: B ϕ) just in case it is a fixed point under update with ϕ .
(27) Incorporation. iB ϕ iff i+ϕ = i
M B ϕ iff M+ϕ = M
Having defined incorporation for information states and subject matters, we can be
more precise about acceptance than we were in §2:
(28) Acceptance. An agent a ∈ Agt in state 〈δa(w),Πa(w)〉 accepts in w that ϕ
just in case ∆a(w)B ϕ . This agent actively accepts that ϕ if it is also the case
that Πa(w)B ϕ and only tacitly accepts that ϕ otherwise.
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3.2 Discourse contexts
We assume that discourse contexts involve three kinds of information: information
about the subject matter of the discourse, information about the acceptance states
of the individual participants in the discourse, and information about the discourse
itself. We limit ourselves to two kinds of information of the latter sort: a (short)
history of assertions made by discourse participants, and a history of questions that
are currently under discussion (QUDs).
(29) Tables. A table T= 〈A,Q〉 consists both of an assertion stack A of sentences
in SL and a Question Under Discussion stack Q of subject matters in M∗.12
Given a table, a model, and a designated actual world, we can construct what we
will use as a discourse context:
(30) Discourse contexts. A context C = 〈W C ,@C ,{δ Ca ,ΠCa : a ∈ Agt},V C ,TC 〉
consists of a pointed model M C ,@C with table TC .
A discourse context is a time-slice of a conversation happening at @C . We will
subscript our contexts with (integer) indices to indicate an order for these slices.
Since W , @, and V will not change from context to context, we will omit the
C -superscript altogether from these parameters going forward.
3.3 Discourse moves
With the context structure in place, we can now define various discourse moves. We
earlier decomposed Party into five stages. Formally, these phases can be modeled
with updates, summarized in (31). In the remainder of this section we unpack the
effect of each of these moves, though we will have to leave the detailed formal
version of the running example for a longer paper.
(31) C5 = C0+[AssertAlice C]+ [AssertBob ♦D]+ [ConfirmAlice]+ [RetractAlice]+
[AssertAlice ♦¬C]+ [ConfirmBob]
We begin with an assertion move. A felicitous assertion that ϕ must do (at least)
three things: (i) it must put ϕ on the table, (ii) it must lead to it being publicly
accepted that the author of the assertion accepts that ϕ is true, and (iii) it must ensure
that the issues associated with ϕ come under public attention (this can potentially
change agents’ views). Effect (iii) is the novel component of our framework.
12 We assume some familiarity with stacks here; see e.g. Kaufmann 2000; Isaacs & Rawlins 2008 for
similar uses. We will use the following (standard) notation: push(x,s) is the stack obtained by adding
x to top of stack s, pop(s) is the stack obtained by removing the top element of s, and top(s) is the
top element of s.
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Let us focus on dialogues involving two participants Agt = {s,h}. Though we
assume that these discourse participants utter only sentences in L , it will be useful to
introduce acceptance and attention operators that we as modelers can use to describe
their mental states. Read ‘AccCa (ϕ)’ as ‘agent a actively accepts in C that ϕ is true’,
‘AttCa (ϕ)’ as ‘agent a’s attention state in C supports ϕ’, and ‘ConCa (ϕ)’ as ‘agent a’s
view in C can be consistently updated with ϕ’. For continuity, we interpret these
operators in an update semantics:
(32) Updates for acceptance and attention operators
i+AccCa (ϕ) = {w ∈ i : ∆Ca (w)B ϕ and ΠCa (w)B ϕ}
i+AttCa (ϕ) = {w ∈ i :ΠCa (w)B ϕ}
i+ConCa (ϕ) = {w ∈ i : ∆Ca (w)+ϕ 6= /0}
M+AccCa (ϕ) = M∩MAccCa (ϕ) (etc.)
where MAccCa (ϕ)= {〈w,v〉 : {w}BAccCa (ϕ) iff {v}BAccCa (ϕ)}. It will also be useful
to isolate an agent’s acceptance states across worlds:
(33) Agent states. F Ca = {δ Ca ,ΠCa} is the agent state for a in context C .
The set F Ca encodes a’s contribution to a discourse context.
We are now ready to state our default assertion move (in what follows, we
provide conditions only for components of a context that are affected by a move):
(34) Assertive update. Cn+[Asserts ϕ] = Cn+1 s.t. ACn+1 = push(ϕ,ACn)
Felicity condition: {@}B AccCns (ϕ).
The only thing hardcoded into an assertion move is the update to the assertion stack.
The felicity condition incorporates a variant of Searle’s (1969) sincerity condition
for assertions into our model of rational cooperative communication: a speaker
can assert that ϕ is true only if she (actively) accepts this for the purposes of the
conversation (of course, this might be violated by non-cooperative agents).13
We turn now to publication of acceptance and attention: (ii) and (iii) above.
Rather than building these additional effects directly into our assertive update, we
prefer to see them as arising from a couple of more general communicative principles.
The first principle formalizes how the utterance of any declarative or interrogative
sentence automatically draws attention to its associated issues before any further
processing occurs, and it is commonly accepted that this happens.
(35) Drawing attention. If a speaker utters ϕ , then the agent state of any other
discourse participant is immediately updated with ϕ
13 While sincerity will do here, many philosophers will want to strengthen the felicity condition along
epistemic lines. Williamson (1996, 2000) famously argues that the standard for assertion is knowledge.
For critical responses, see Weiner 2005; Lackey 2007; Hill & Schechter 2007; Kvanvig 2009.
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The attentive operator  appearing in this principle is defined as follows:
(36) F Ca ϕ =
{
[δ Ca ϕ](w)(M) = δ Ca (w)(M)
[ΠCa ϕ](w) =ΠCa (w)+ϕ .
The update (36) accomplishes the goal of bringing the issues associated with ϕ to a
hearer’s attention. Applying ϕ to h’s agent state F Cnh in Cn updates her attention
state ΠCnh (w) with ϕ at each w ∈W and shifts her view to δ Cnh (w)(ΠCnh (w)+ϕ).14
The second communicative principle formalizes how hearers will typically infer
that felicity conditions are satisfied, and it is commonly accepted that this happens
(our formulation of this principle is crude; we leave its development for the future).
(37) Felicity inferences. If a discourse move has a felicity condition of the form
{@}B ϕ where ϕ explicitly concerns the state of the acting participant and
another discourse participant does not have good grounds for believing that
this felicity condition is violated, suspended, or altered in the context of use,
then this other participant’s agent state is updated with ϕ
where the informative operator  appearing in this principle is defined as follows:
(38) F Ca ϕ =
[δ
C
a ϕ](w)(M) =
{
δ Ca (w)(M)+ϕ if M B ϕ
δ Ca (w)(M) otherwise
[ΠCa ϕ](w) =ΠCa (w)+ϕ
Of course, it would be possible to hardwire the result of (38) directly into our
assertive update, but we take the fact that felicity conditions can be violated or
suspended as evidence against such a maneuver.
The informative operator  is a bit more complicated. Unlike with the attentive
update ϕ where the change in an agent’s attention state is primary and any change
in her view is derivative, the aim of ϕ is to update an agent’s view with ϕ . This
being so, ϕ must also adjust the agent’s attention state to ensure that updating
her view returns a visible set of possible worlds. Although δ Ca (w)(M)+ϕ needn’t
be visible at M when M 6B ϕ , it can be shown that δ Ca (w)(M)+ϕ will be visible
14 To ensure that ϕ always returns a genuine agent state satisfying Introspection, we must further
constrain δa and Πa somewhat. The following strengthening of Introspection would do the trick:
(i) Strengthened Introspection (SI). For all w,v ∈W , if M ∈M∗ is a refinement of ΠCa (w) and
v ∈ δ Ca (w)(M), then δ Ca (v)(M) = δ Ca (w)(M) and ΠCa (v) =ΠCa (w).
Since each subject matter trivially refines itself, SI entails Introspection (and if one is already willing
to buy into Introspection, it is a short step to buy into SI). Moreover, it is easy to prove that ϕ
preserves SI (and so Introspection as well). We leave this as an exercise for the reader.
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at M so long as M B ϕ . Moreover, we take an informative update ϕ to percolate
through an agent’s acceptance state so that this update doesn’t just disappear after
subsequent shifts in her attention. When updating δ Ca (w)(M) with ϕ is guaranteed
to return a visible information state (i.e., when M B ϕ), we update it.15,16
Following the felicity inference AccCns (ϕ) in particular, h’s attention state and
view at each w ∈W shift to ΠCnh (w)+AccCns (ϕ) and δ Cnh (w)(ΠCnh (w)+AccCns (ϕ))+
AccCns (ϕ) respectively. It becomes commonly accepted that h accepts that s actively
accepts that ϕ is true.
We will henceforth use Cn+[Asserts ϕ] to designate the context Cn+1 obtained
from Cn by first applying Drawing Attention, then Assertive Update, and then
Felicity Inferences based on the felicity condition {@}B AccCns (ϕ); we bracket off
the possibility that h has good grounds for believing that this condition is violated,
suspended, or altered. Assuming in addition that the felicity condition is actually
met, it is straightforward to prove that in Cn+1, (a) for each sentence letter ϕAt
appearing in ϕ , the corresponding subject matter MϕAt is an SUP among {s,h} in @,
and (b) the property B AccCn+1s (ϕ) of views is common ground among {s,h} in @.
The combination of assertive update, drawing attention, and felicity inferences thus
accomplishes all three of our stated goals (i)-(iii).
Turning now to hearer response moves, let us consider what can happen following
an assertion. The most straightforward reaction is when a hearer confirms the
assertion (this is the default or unmarked response since an assertion “projects” its
confirmation (Farkas & Bruce 2010)). If h confirms s’s assertion, then h publicly
accepts that the top element of the stack is true, and this sentence is removed from
the stack. Confirmation is defined only if the assertion stack is nonempty and has a
felicity condition that this move will not lead to inconsistency.
(39) Confirmation
Cn+[Confirmh] = Cn+1 s.t. (i) ACn+1 = pop(ACn)
(ii) F Cn+1h = F
Cn
h  top(ACn)
Felicity condition: {@}BConCnh (top(ACn)). Defined in Cn only if ACn 6= 〈〉.
Again, we overload ‘+’ and henceforth use Cn+[Confirmh] to designate the context
Cn+1 obtained from Cn by applying Confirmation followed by Felicity Inferences. It
is straightforward to prove that in Cn+1, the property B AccCn+1h (top(ACn)) of views
15 It is also straightforward to prove that ϕ preserves Strengthened Introspection.
16 While our informative update works well in many cases, it should be regarded as a first pass. An
alternative approach would be to have ϕ update only the agent’s view at ΠCa (w)+ϕ and then have
the agent reprocess or reconsider earlier discourse moves whenever her attention shifts (Franke &
de Jager 2010 floats a similar proposal). However, this makes things considerably more complicated;
for one thing, it would require discourse participants to carry around a conversational record.
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is common ground among {s,h} in @. It is also straightforward to show that if s
felicitously asserts that ϕ is true, this is subsequently confirmed by h, and it remains
commonly accepted that s accepts that ϕ is true after this confirmation, then the
property B ϕ of views acquires common ground status among {s,h} in @.
At the other end of the spectrum of reactions that pop the assertion stack, we
have the non-canonical discourse move of retraction.
(40) Retraction. Cn+[Retracts] = Cn+1 s.t. ACn+1 = pop(ACn)
Defined in Cn only if ACn 6= 〈〉.17
Felicity condition: {@}B ¬AccCns (top(ACn)).
Under the current setup, one’s view must shift before retraction; if it does not, then
the felicity condition for retraction will not be met. Suppose that s felicitously asserts
that ϕ is true and later felicitously retracts this assertion. By the felicity condition
for assertion, s must have actively accepted that ϕ is true at the time this sentence
was used. But her retraction signals a shift in her view.
Besides confirmation and retraction, of course, there are a variety of other
response options. A hearer might reject a prior move by making an assertion that
updates the stack in such a way that it can no longer be emptied only by confirmation
moves (arguably, this is just what it is to disagree—to be in a conversational context
where the assertion stack can be fully popped only after at least one of the participants
retracts an earlier public commitment or the participants agree to disagree (cf. Farkas
& Bruce 2010)). As we have been stressing all along, a hearer might alternatively
just resist a prior move by making an assertion or asking a question with the aim of
generating further discussion about a relevant subordinate issue.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced resistance moves, a new type of move in the space
between agreement and disagreement. We homed in on a particular kind of resistance
move signaled by an epistemic possibility modal, and argued that this species of
resistance targets attention: ♦p draws attention to the issue of whether or not p holds.
If an agent was not previously attending to this issue, there may be propositions that
are not ‘visible’ that would cause them to retract a claim, and drawing attention to
such an issue can trigger retraction. Our proposal for the dynamics of resistance
is that it involves coordinating on subsidiary moves while the original (resisted)
claim is still in limbo; once this sub-coordination is complete, agents again consider
whether to incorporate the original claim into the common ground.
17 Since one can retract only what one has placed on the assertion stack, this move should be defined
only if top(ACn) was previously uttered by s. Articulating this condition in our formal model would
require us to keep track of who adds particular items to the table (cf. Gunlogson 2008).
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